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Moreover, unlike Foucault's subject, which is limited in that subjectivity is folded back into a vaguely 
expanded notion of "power," this revised Althusserian subject allows careful reading of texts. The critic 
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reader. For example, Wordsworth's "The Solitary Reaper" installs the reader in multiple positions: a 
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"a bare subject without a world never 
`is' proximally, nor is it ever given." 
Heidegger 
After the British hostage, Terry Waite, came back to England from 
five years in solitary confinement he spoke live on television and made 
a very revealing verbal slip. Recounting his suffering in Beirut he told 
how one day he was allowed a single postcard. This had a picture of John 
Bunyan on the front. Then, said Waite, "turning over the car," he read 
a message of encouragement on the back. What had brought his 
unconscious thoughts so close to death? Was it the physical deprivation 
only or was it rather the way a normal human identity had been denied 
to him by the others around, who had treated him as though he hardly 
existed at all? 
Perhaps we might now see that a major weakness of classic 
Marxism was its anthropology: its determination to define the human 
in terms ofa single instinct, and that instinct as biological survival rather 
than the desire for recognition. Arguably, then, it has been the achieve- 
ment of Althusser's writing to turn Marxism away from questions of 
production and survival towards the issues of reproduction and identity. 
To read Althusser this way is to treat certain aspects of his project as 
residual, particularly (1) a willingness to retain a privileging of eco- 
nomic practice via the notion that the social formation is ("ultimately") 
a structure in dominance, and (2) the assumption associated with this 
privileging, that a knowledge of the real is available to science and its 
"theoretical practitioners" but not to the rest of us who are irredeem- 
ably sunk in ideology. It was no accident, as we used to say, that in the 
United States the otherwise admirably comprehensive poststructuralist 
reading lists went straight from Adorno to Barthes, missing Althusser, 
and it is entirely to be welcomed that serious attempts are being 
undertaken to make good that lack. Althusser earns the right to go on 
being read (or to be read for the first time) in the 1990s because of three 
conceptual interventions, each of which depends on the others. 
(1) Althusser reconceptualizes history and totality in terms of 
"different times," in fact of time as multidimensional, a swerving 
bundle of uneven temporalities (Althusser and Balibar 94-100). I have 1
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found myself frequently citing and attempting to amplify this insight 
(Easthope, British 16-19 and Literary 182-88), and am glad to note that 
Robert Young in White Mythologies (1990) gives a warm endorsement 
to Althusser's conception of a totality which "is never totalisable 
because it is decentred and displaced in time" (White 58). (2) Since 
Althusser rejects the Hegelian and (early) Marxist account of totality as 
an expressive unity and since that conception of an object presupposes 
correspondingly a notion of Man as humanist subject, Althusser must 
replace any form of epistemology that presumes the real to yield 
knowledge of itself with one in which knowledge is emphatically the 
outcome of production, a process of the construction of knowledge (to 
say this is not to deny certain problems with his own epistemological 
stance) (3). Since, again, Althusser is working with (and working 
through) a rethinking of totality as decentered, it is not merely the 
subject of knowledge who has to be thought of as situated in relation to 
a specific form of discourse-it is subjectivity in general. I would 
persist in claiming that Althusser's most important contribution, pre- 
saged in his earlier work but becoming explicit in the essay on ideology 
of 1969, is to rethink subjectivity as an effect of both ideology and the 
process of the unconscious. 
From this basis in a concern with the subject, my paper will be 
directed at several topics. It will first take the essay on ideology and try 
to update some of our readings of that text. Then it will turn to review 
the way the essay's implications were developed into a particular form 
of analysis in what I would want to call "British post-structuralism," 
at this point offering a comment on the comparative limitations of what 
you can do in the same mode by drawing on the work of Foucault. Third, 
with a poem as illustration and with a more positive intention, I shall 
enter an expansion and defence of the Althusserian notion of the subject 
as afforded a position and point(s) of identification in and by the text. 
All of this briefly, and for the purposes of discussion. 
Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses 
Althusser's essay argues that for an economy to survive it must not 
merely produce but also reproduce itself. This entails the reproduction 
of labour-power and so of a workforce submissive to the rules of the 
established order. Effected by state apparatuses (institutions), submis- 
sion is secured by ideology which operates to reproduce subjects, to turn 
"concrete individuals" (newborn babies) into speaking subjects. It 
does so by "interpellating" or hailing subjects, constructing us so that 
we come to think of ourselves as free, conscious, choosing selves (thus, 2




for example, when the alarm clock goes on Monday morning I say "I'm 
getting up" rather than "Here is someone submitting to the work- 
discipline"). We are constructed in a process of recognition/ 
misrecognition such that the single subject recognizes itself as a subject 
because it duplicates-reflects-an Absolute Subject (as Samuel does 
at I Samuel 3 when he replies to God's call with the words, "Here am 
I"). The process of recognition/misrecognition "is speculary, i.e., a 
mirror-structure" (Lenin 168). 
In a critique of Althusser's theory that should be essential reading 
for anyone concerned with the area, Paul Hirst proposes that this 
account of ideology is not fully coherent, particularly over two issues: 
it is functionalist in that it supposes the subject as fixed and given (Hirst 
40-74). It is functionalist in the traditional sociological sense that an 
explanation is functionalist if it understands a social feature as an effect 
contributing to the overall stable functioning of society as a whole; 
Althusser's theory of ideology is functionalist in that it envisages a 
mode of production (capitalism) as reproducing itself in the form of 
classes (ruling/working), which in turn are reproduced by the state 
apparatuses as subjects (rulers/work-force) who are the effect of a 
destination for that mode of production-a process of reproduction so 
perfectly mediated it excludes any possibility of disturbance, contradic- 
tion and radical transformation. In doing so-in order to do so- 
Althusser's account conceives the subject as fixed and given. The 
subject misrecognizes itself in an image reflected in the Absolute 
Subject but, further, as Hirst points out: 
[that image is] recognized by the subject as its image. Recognition, 
the crucial moment of the constitution (activation) of the subject, 
presupposes a point of cognition prior to the recognition. (65) 
In other words, if I recognize my identity (even in a misrecognized 
image), I am already there able to do the recognising: I am myself, an 
absolute subject, one that is (metaphysically) pre-given. [In Making 
Sense of Marx Jon Elster has developed a much larger critique of 
functionalist tendencies in Marxism anticipated in Hirst's response to 
Althusser.] 
There is, of course, a quick remedy here, for both Althusser's 
functionalism and the accompanying notion of a metaphysical subject. 
It comes from Lacan's account of the mirror stage, which Althusser 
avowedly leans on for the idea of misrecognition. In Lacan the subject 
only ever misrecognizes its identity, there is no recognition and no 
ensuing fixity, the subject is always caught between the stability of the 3
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I it thinks it is and the unconscious process of which this I is a provisional 
and temporary effect (Ecrits 1-7). Reinserted into the social formation, 
this notion of a fluid subjectivity once again oils the wheels of change, 
perhaps even making them skid. That "an analysis of the place of the 
unconscious is a vital element in ideological struggle" is the theme of 
Coward and Ellis in Language and Materialism (1977), for the reason 
stated with brisk confidence by Catherine Belsey with reference to the 
Lacanian theory of ego: "It is this contradiction in the subject- 
between the conscious self, which is conscious in so far as it is able to 
feature in discourse, and the self which is only partially represented 
there-that constitutes the source of possible change" (85). 
A concept of the "subject-in-process" does overcome the problem 
of Althusser's functionalism, but at a cost which is well-known and too 
frequently insisted upon by friends and enemies to require documenta- 
tion. lithe subject is in process, if the I is only the effect of misrecognition, 
if this is the source and motor for social transformation, what are we to 
say about conscious choice and deliberate collective action, the tradi- 
tional modes of radical and progressive politics? I do not expect to be 
able to resolve the theoretical issue and its conjoint political dilemma 
but, at the risk of a slight digression, I shall pursue a little the question 
of recognition/misrecognition. 
Recognition/Misrecognition 
Freud, from the first, seeks to equate the ego with the perception- 
consciousness system (though increasingly through his work this 
equation becomes qualified). The conscious I perceives and knows the 
world of external reality; it recognizes it as though from outside, from 
a supposedly exterior point of origin outside that which is simply given. 
This account of the "bodily ego" has been developed notably by 
Richard Wollheim and deployed by him to attack Lacanian theory as 
represented by Juliet Mitchell by arguing that through an essentially 
corporeal process the I develops as "thebody registers itself ' (Wollheim 
"Psychoanalysis" 64; see also the reply by Zaretsky and Chodorow). 
More recently, Malcolm Bowie in a book on Lacan has drawn attention 
to the fact that Lacanian theory of the I--which treats the ego as 
misrecognition and therefore exclusively as an unconscious process- 
has nothing to say about the I that recognizes external reality (18-19). 
Consciousness, recognition, rational choice or the unconscious, 
misrecognition, "it speaks"? Recourse to an unfashionable writer may 
go some way to unsettle this binary opposition. Maurice Merleau- 
Ponty, Lacan's close friend, sets out in The Structure of Behaviour of 4




1942 to criticize the Cartesian opposition between categories of the 
human and the animal, between mind and body, though in doing so he 
is impelled to circumscribe areas in which human perception appears 
to differ from that of the other animals (he has at his disposal plenty of 
contemporary scientific evidence from human and animal psychology). 
What Merleau-Ponty proposes is that other animals cannot perceive the 
object in itself, that is, independent of its context. Spiders, for example, 
can see a fly as a fly when it is struggling in a web but not if one is simply 
dropped into their nest. After citing an experiment in which chimpan- 
zees were set the task of moving boxes Meleau-Ponty asserts: 
What is lacking in the chimpanzee is the capacity of creating 
relations between visual stimuli (and between the motor excita- 
tions which they elicit) which express and symbolize its most 
familiar kinetic melodies. The animal cannot put itself in the place 
of the moveable thing and see itself as the goal. It cannot vary the 
points of view, just as it cannot recognize something in different 
perspectives as the same thing. . . . What is really lacking in the 
animal is the symbolic behavior which it would have to possess in 
order to find an invariant in the external object. (118) 
To recognize something "as the same thing," to find "an invariant in 
the external object": while other animals and the human animal do 
perceive and respond to external reality, only the speaking subject can 
represent an object to itself as an entity, as having a fixed identity across 
space and time. We can do so, Merleau-Ponty explains, because: (1) we 
have an image of our bodies as "a concrete unity capable of entering 
into a multiplicity of relations without losing itself ' (precisely the 
image of the unified body that Lacan says the infant finds in its 
reflection); (2) we have language and can line up the sign (signifier and 
signified) with an object in external reality (118). 
It looks as though Lacan's account of the I in the mirror stage has 
been influenced by Merleau-Ponty. Since object and subject are always 
produced together and reciprocally, the spatially discriminated and 
temporally persisting world of entities perceived by the speaking 
subject must correspond to and support the effect of "the mental 
permanence of the I" (2). On this admittedly undeveloped showing, it 
seems that even the I as a perception-consciousness system is more of 
an unconsciously charged effect than conventional psychologies con- 
cede. While nothing in this argument cancels the reality of perception 
and the fact that perception is perception of the real, it does tend to 
strengthen the claims of the Lacanian account of the ego, certainly as 5
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these might be denied by appeal to either Freud or conventional 
psychology. External objects really are perceived by speaking subjects, 
but those objects (and the very capacity to perceive them as entities) are, 
as it were, one side in the surface which has on its other side an 
unconscious lining, so that objects in the real count at the same time as 
objects of desire. It is consistent with this position that Lacan should 
define the subject's ego as "that which is reflected of his [sic] form in 
his objects" (194). The world that I see around me (which as a neonate 
I could not see because the ego had not yet developed) is caught up in 
a phantasy by which my identity is reflected back to me and as me. 
Interpellation and Subject Position 
Althusser's essay on ideology reached England in the early 1970s 
and was developed especially in the work of the film journal, Screen, 
as a means of analysing the way aesthetic texts afford a position to the 
reader as an effect of discourse. Althusser, however, was rethought with 
Hirst's criticisms already built in; a theory was worked through in which 
the ideological operation of a text was assessed in terms of how it sought 
to interpellate or position its reader even while that operation itself was 
conceived on the basis of a Lacanian account of misrecognition. In a 
story I've tried to tell elsewhere (British 1-122), the project of integrat- 
ing (Althusserian) Marxism with (Lacanian) psychoanalysis on the 
grounds of a (Saussurian) analysis of specific signifying practices 
ramified in Britain during the 1970s and early 1980s from film theory 
into cultural studies, branches of the social sciences, the study of 
history, social psychology, art history, even musicology, and finally of 
course literary theory. In doing so the concept of the positioning of the 
subject as an effect of discourse became qualified and complexified. 
What one might call the classic Screen view was at its strongest 
when facing off a polarized opposition between realism and modern- 
ism. Thus, in realist modes of representation the attempt by various 
strategies to efface the signifier offered the reader a position which was 
produced but whose production was denied, a position as a would-be 
autonomous or transcendental subject therefore; in modernist modes in 
which the signifier was foregrounded, the reader was denied any such 
comfortable superiority and compelled to experience the process of his 
or her own construction. Further, it was argued that Hollywood consti- 
tuted a visual regime in which the would-be transcendental position 
should be characterized as typically masculine, so that modernist and 
avant-garde texts could be thought of as opening possibilities to the 
feminine gaze. [It goes without saying that at stake is an implied 
position, one concluded from textual analysis, not an empirical re- 6




sponse by an empirical reader.] Three important reconsiderations of the 
notion of subject positioning need to be mentioned. 
(1) In an article on "The Avant-garde and its Imaginary" first 
published in 1977, Constance Penley criticized the possibility that the 
avant-garde text disrupted its spectator's apparent self-sufficiency (3- 
28). She argued first, that the subject as an I always had to find a place 
in what Lacan terms the Imaginary order (the alternative being psycho- 
sis), and second, that the fragmentation of the avant-garde text was 
always matched by the spectator's epistemophilia, that is, by he or she 
knowing it was such a text and so mastering its proffered self-divisions. 
On this showing, other factors are at work in the positioning of the 
subject than anything like a unitary relation between text and subject- 
clearly the subject was already constrained prior to its encounter with 
the text (knowing it was a work of the avant-garde, for instance). (2) In 
an article of 1984 Liz Cowie draws on Freud's essay "A Child is Being 
Beaten" and its development by J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis in their 
essay, "Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality," to propose that far from 
a film's viewer being given a single position, the text in fact offered 
everyone multiple points of identification. Just as the subject might find 
a place in the fantasy scenario of "a child is being beaten" by imagining 
a rival is being beaten, or they themselves, or they are watching the 
beating, so a film spectator's identifications might be split simulta- 
neously between characters, between different aspects of a situation, or 
for that matter different objects and effects on the screen. Again the 
notion of a singular subject position is challenged. (3) In their authori- 
tative study, Film Theory: An Introduction (1988), Rob Lapsley and 
Michael Westlake review the Screen endeavour to define realism in 
terms of the position of dominant specularity, as it were, outside and 
looking on, and find compelling reasons for challenging the belief that 
there is anything like a single exchange between text and reader. Instead 
they offer the view "that the spectator judging the text to be realistic 
identifies with one who knows the truth," that the spectators identify 
not simply with a position offered by the text but are predisposed by 
a number of discursive effects (including the location of truth in a 
particular society) to adopt an image of themselves that is locally 
supported by the text (178). There are clearly problems here that I shall 
try to unpack a little with an example. 7
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Positions and Identifications: "The Solitary Reaper" 
Classic structuralism was superseded, quite rightly, because it 
hoped for the impossible, to freeze the text in an atemporal, synchronic 
moment. Poststructuralism, in contrast, by stressing the variability of 
the text-that it is always read differently across time-begins to make 
it impossible to say anything about textuality that could not, in 
principle, be as rapidly annulled. Notions of the positioning of the 
subject by the text go some way to resolve this dilemma for they 
recognize both the effectivity of the text on one side and the potential 
infinity of reader response on the other. The concept of "the dialectic 
of the subject" is anticipated in Lacan's account of how the linear 
unfolding of the signifying chain is always caught in and by the subject's 
prospective and retroactive interpretation of that chain (it is for this 
reason Lacan affirms there is "an incessant sliding of the signified 
under the signifier," 154). In this exchange the subject is constituted by 
the object to the extent that he or she is transformed by it so that "the 
subject is at once the producer and product of the meaning" (Lapsley 
and Westlake 53). 
This account ensues from the Althusserian intervention, and I find 
it hard to see by what other means such a persuasive and forceful kind 
of analysis might have been achieved. Despite his retrospective claim 
that it was "not power, but the subject" that was the general theme of 
his research, Foucault's project consistently suffers from his determi- 
nation to fold back subjectivity into a vaguely expanded notion of 
"power" (Foucault 209). Although his studies-of punishment and 
discipline, of the history of sexuality-present a detailed historical 
account of discursive and social practices, they fail to explain how and 
why the subjectivity should ever desire to become instituted 
(interpellated) into these practices. In defying the notion of the uncon- 
scious, in fact seeking to redescribe it-from an essentially sociological 
point of view-as a mode of "power," Foucault's work in fact becomes 
reductive to the extent that it ignores the challenge of this other. Aware 
of the dangers of functionalism, not least because of Althusser's 
ideology essay (as the 1982 Afterword acknowledges), Foucault struggles 
to inject into his account of power some recognition of the radical 
possibilities that Althusser's essay so obviously demands, and (as my 
own history here recalls) very soon receives, certainly in the work of 
British poststructuralists. Power enables and disables, it provokes and 
expresses resistance while also containing it: this overtly psychoana- 
lytic conception of structuration and effectivity (power now sounds like 
nothing so much as Freud's version of sexuality) is forced into a social 8




and ideological matrix where it does not fit. Subsequent accounts, such 
as that offered as New Historicism, fail to resolve these difficulties, and 
only demonstrate more clearly how unsatisfactory it is to try to make 
a Foucauldian social analysis apply to texts. 
Resistance, enabling/disabling, expression/repression-this move- 
ment is surely much better theorized on the model of interpellation in 
terms of the way the text offers positions for its reading which, ac- 
cording to the dialectic of the subject, are always both accepted and 
exceeded in specifically analyzable way. As for instance in the case of 
the following poem, first published in 1807 in Wordsworth's Poems in 
Two Volumes: 
The Solitary Reaper 
Behold her, single in the field, 
Yon solitary Highland Lass! 
Reaping and singing by herself; 
Stop here, or gently pass! 
Alone she cuts and binds the grain, 
And sings a melancholy strain; 
0 listen! for the Vale profound 
Is overflowing with the sound. 
No Nightingale did ever chaunt 
More welcome notes to weary bands 
Of travellers in some shady haunt, 
Among the Arabian sands: 
A voice so thrilling ne'er was heard 
In spring-time from the Cuckoo-bird, 
Breaking the silence of the seas 
Among the farthest Hebrides. 
Will no one tell me what she sings? - 
Perhaps the plaintive numbers flow 
For old, unhappy, far-off things, 
And battles long ago: 
Or is it some more humble lay, 
Familiar matter of today? 
Some natural sorrow, loss, or pain, 
That has been, and may be again? 9
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Whate'er the theme, the Maiden sang 
As if her song could have no ending; 
I saw her singing at her work, 
And o'er her sickle bending:- 
I listened, motionless and still; 
and, as I mounted up the hill, 
The music in my heart I bore, 
Long after it was heard no more. 
Long before the individual identity of the poem comes into view at all 
the text functions as a point representing a number of imbricated 
intertextual categories, each of which hails the contemporary reader 
into a certain identification for which the single text is one supporting 
instance. A schematic outline of these might indicate: 
1. Fiction/Art. Present-day Western society operates with a broad 
opposition across the discursive formation between "documentary" 
and what might be called "fictional-artistic" discourses. Each acts to 
exclude properties and effects from the other as do the other Great 
Oppositions (production/consumption, work/leisure, place of work/ 
home, duty/pleasure, city/country). While documentary discourse ad- 
vances itself as legitimate, official, factual and objective, fictional- 
artististic discourse must occur as its other-subjective, potentially 
transgressive, the bearer of values, even indeed the meaning of life. 
Since the opposition masculine/feminine pervades the discursive for- 
mation all this tends to install the reader approaching a poem such as 
"The Solitary Reaper" in a feminine position. 
2. High Culture/Popular Culture. As part of high culture and the national 
canon of English literature, the poem promises the subject a flattering 
self-identification as a reader of high culture, that is, I would argue, 
structured according to a certain economy between the ego ideal, the 
ego and desire, one which differs from that afforded intertextually by 
popular culture. The high cultural reader is positioned in a relation to 
the superego which, paradoxically, constitutes a rationalization for 
possible forms of transgression inhibited in popular culture. 
3. Literature/Poetry. John Ellis points out that the cinenfagoer is 
captured by "an identification with the cinematic apparatus itself ' 
(41), just as the spectator at the cinema-or participant in taught 
courses on film-reveals a predisposition for "visual pleasure" so that 10




all such audiences share desire in the form of scopophilia (to use the 
more elaborate term by which Freud's English translator renders the 
simpler German Schaulust). Similarly, between the different artistic 
media-graphic art, music, dancing-the Wordsworth poem inscribes 
its reader as one who finds pleasure in the play of the verbal signifier 
(this poem is written in lines that are patterned solely on the basis of 
phonetic repetition, mainly iambic tetrameter, with another purely 
phonetic scheme recurring in the four stanzas of eight lines rhyming 
ababccdd). 
4. Genre. The lyric has a specific place within poetry, although it 
overlaps in certain respects with modes for "personal expression" in 
other arts and certainly invites the reader into an identification with 
"the individual voice" not at all so easily available in other narrative 
and epic genres. It would be useful and valid at this point to call on 
Foucault's account of confessional discourse, for this is in fact an 
instance of discourse in which a represented I "confesses" an inward 
delectation and "movement of the soul" to an unnamed interlocutor (a 
movement which is erotized moreover). But from this generalized 
theme and into the particularity of the text Foucault's account could not 
take us-it would not for example consider how, in a historical 
innovation_ , the lyric genre becomes subsumed into a grouping of texts 
by author, so that the reader submits to what might be called "the desire 
for Wordsworth" (identity therefore as a sensitive, high-minded belle 
ame whose profound self-concern is masked as a deeply significant love 
of Nature). 
5. Textual Operation (the signifier). Only now does the particular 
identity of the text begin to emerge and be at issue. "The Solitary 
Reaper" is certainly a poem, that is, a certain organisation of the 
signifier, but it conforms to a specific kind of signifying practice 
(Romantic poetry in the English post-Renaissance tradition) that 
attempts to efface the signifier by promoting the signified, an individual 
voice represented as "really" speaking. Thus the use of the present 
tense and demonstratives in the first two stanzas (the reader is ordered 
with a present imperative to "Behold her," to "Listen," to see "Yon 
solitary Highland Lass") implies a situated first-person speaker who is 
nominated in the third stanza ("Will no one tell me what she sings?") 
and finds explicit first-person expression in the repeated "I's" of the 
fourth verse. Together with these effects, the sustained theme and 
syntax imitate a personalized stream of consciousness that plausibly 
manages a transition from present to past tense as-within the repre- 11
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sented course of the text-the speaker walks past the labouring woman 
and out of sight of her "up the hill." Insofar as the text tends to become 
a script for a voice observing and reflecting in the present, the reader 
is compelled to overlook the traces of the signifier that makes this 
possible and pass transparently into identification with the "I" of the 
poem, a version of "Wordsworth" (see above). 
6. Within the Text. According to the familiar patriarchal binary in which 
"Man is Culture, Woman is Nature" and in which the mastering I of 
the look belongs to a man while typically the object investigated by that 
gaze is a woman, the I of this text is undoubtedly masculinized. In the 
text there are multiple points of identification, not only with the 
represented speaker and the woman he sees (and hears) but also with the 
song as he tries to capture it, with other human figures (the "travellers" 
in the desert, the implied agents of "battle" and "sorrow"), with 
animate but non-human figures (the nightingale and the cuckoo), and 
with inanimate objects represented such as the "vale," the "sands," 
the "Hebrides," the "hill," even the "grain" the woman cuts (presum- 
ably with a sharpened sickle). There is also a seductive identification 
with the woman's mysteriously untranslatable song. To be sure, 
discrepancies and disjunction open up between these points of identi- 
fication. Since the speaker does not know what she sings, surely he has 
to become her in order to imagine (in verse two) what she sings? How 
does the desert cohere with the Hebrides? Yet what is perhaps remark- 
able rather is how far the text is able to make so much hold together 
within a unified scenario in which a man, confronted by his other in the 
form of a bending woman concerned only with herself and singing in 
an unknown tongue, is able to transform her into a knowable object of 
desire he can incorporate into his own experience. 
Just as all the objects represented in the poem seem able to reflect 
back an appropriately consistent image of the speaker's subjectivity, so 
the text itself offers to secure a confirming identity for its reader. 
Referring back to points one to four, we might suppose that the woman's 
song as he envisions it aims to transcend and reconcile the differences 
between him and her but also (since the poem itself is a lyric) that 
between reader and text and (since poetry is a species of song) between 
text and genre, and further between genre, medium, high culture and art. 
Of course there are any number of strategies by which one could begin 
to undo this apparent unity and closure: by picking up the poem's 
representation of "song" and "work" and taking that back to the 
opposition between documentary and fictional-aesthetic discourse; by 
interrogating its dependence on notions of masculine activity and 12




feminine passivity when it is the woman's work coupled with her 
aesthetic production placed as the other that is the condition for his 
mastering and expressive experience put at the centre of the poem; by 
recalling that signified depends upon signifier and pointing out, perhaps 
irrelevantly but disturbingly nevertheless, that "Hebrides" is a written 
signifier that mingles "He" with "brides." 
It does not matter a great deal how the proffered identifications are 
set at a distance. The main point is rather what makes such a reading 
against the grain both legitimate and necessary. In the problematic 
developed from the Althusserian account of interpellation, as appropri- 
ately corrected and reformulated in terms of the dialectic of the subject, 
all my troublesome circumlocutions have a strategic and political 
context-the text offers or provides or affords or seeks to secure a 
position for its reader, it invites or encourages or promotes this or that 
kind of identification. All these arise from a theoretical assumption 
inscribed through this framework of analysis: the text, now, in the 
present instance is trying to do something to us and always failing. The 
problematic obliges us to attend both to specific questions about how 
the text works and put its effectivity in question. It is in this respect 
always transformatory. 
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